Diana Reddy is a Doctoral Fellow at the Law, Economics, and Politics Center at UC Berkeley Law, and a PhD candidate in UCB's Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. Her research interests lie at the intersection of work law, law and political economy, law and social movements, and social stratification and inequality. Her recent scholarship has been published or is forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal, the Yale Law Journal Forum, and the Emory Law Journal. She is also a contributor to the Law and Political Economy blog.
Diana graduated Order of the Coif from New York University School of Law, where she was a Root-Tilden-Kern Public Interest Scholar. She has an MA in Sociology and a BA in Cultural and Social Anthropology, magna cum laude, from Stanford University. After law school, Diana clerked for the Hon. Theodore McKee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and for the Hon. Kimba Wood of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Before her return to academia, Diana practiced labor and employment law. Diana served as in-house counsel for the California Teachers Association, a labor union representing over 325,000 educators in the state of California. Prior to that, she was an associate with Altshuler Berzon LLP in San Francisco, CA, where she litigated labor, environmental, class action, and voting rights cases. She was also a Fellow in the General Counsel's Office of the AFL-CIO in Washington, DC.
Diana is a member of the state bars of California and Texas.
Research and Articles
AFTER THE LAW OF APOLITICAL ECONOMY: LEGITIMIZING UNIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, FORTHCOMING YALE LAW JOURNAL V. 132 (EXPECTED WINTER 2022).
In a time of historically high levels of economic inequality and rapidly shifting public opinion on labor unions, this Article centers the issue of labor union legitimacy. To explain the drastic decline in union membership and power since the late 1970s, legal scholarship has emphasized structural economic changes and the ossification of labor law. But the field has failed to sufficiently interrogate the relationship between these changes and broader normative contestation, about political economy and worker power, within American culture and law. In contrast, this Article treats the question of labor union legitimacy–when and why unions have been seen as serving the public interest, or not–as central to understanding the efficacy of unions, and American public law more broadly, in opposing workplace authoritarianism and promoting economic justice. Synthesizing social theory, legal doctrine, and years of original empirical work, this Article reinterprets the structural and normative dimensions of labor’s 20th century legitimacy and offers novel insights into its 21st.
“THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN ILLEGAL STRIKE”: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE STRIKE IN LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, 130 YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM 421 (2021).
In theorizing the lack of strikes in recent decades, legal scholars have focused on the rules that make striking difficult, even counterproductive, for workers. But while American law on striking is ambivalent at best, the impact of legal restrictions on labor protest has always been mediated by broader political economy. One hundred years ago, as the critique to Gilded Age inequality raged, strikes by emergent labor unions made the stakes of the “labor question” apparent. These strikes were subject to legal repression, and in the shorter term, were often seen as failures. In the longer term, though, they laid the foundation for the New Deal order and its modest compression of economic inequality.
That order—built in part on a depoliticization of unions’ role in the workplace—proved unable to withstand the neoliberal turn. Yet, in today’s new Gilded Age, workers are tentatively rediscovering the power of the strike, bad law notwithstanding. Labor activists have long proclaimed, “There is no such thing as an illegal strike, only an unsuccessful one,” inviting the question of how strikes can be successful today, in spite of an inhospitable legal regime. Strikes are not just “economic weapons”; they are political protest. And the success of strikes today should be measured not only by their immediate economic wins, but also by their longer-term sociopolitical ones—to the extent they help upend the dominant regulatory and discursive impulses of recent decades, and like the strikes of the Progressive Era, legitimate a new vision of law and political economy.
PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW: BRINGING LABOR BACK INTO THE STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 70 EMORY L. J. 63 (2020) (WITH CATHERINE L. FISK).
Within the rich, interdisciplinary literature on law and social movements, scholarly attention has often focused on how the civil rights movement, and other movements that share a resemblance to it, have mobilized law; less attention has been paid to the labor movement’s experience of being regulated by law. In this Article, we ask how refocusing on the experiences of labor unions regulated by law complicates understandings of how movements shape law, and law shapes movements, in turn. To explore the relationship between labor and law at a critical historical juncture, we delve into the largely unexplored legal history of the first major damages judgment against a labor union under the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Decided as the New Deal era gave way to the “rights revolution” of the 1950s and 1960s, this case dramatizes the costs of the labor movement’s distinct regulatory framework. Law helped institutionalize unions—to give them autonomy, power, and legitimacy. At the same time, it subjected them to an increasingly restrictive regulatory scheme that made it harder for them to act—or to be seen—as a social movement. Refocusing on labor re-centers the role of law in constructing the jurisprudential boundaries which channeled social movement activity throughout the twentieth century. As social movements today challenge these boundaries in order to assert more intersectional grievances, interrogating taken-for-granted notions about law and movements could not be more important.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol70/iss1/2
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, DIANA REDDY & BETSY A. WILLIAMS, LAW FIRMS AS DEFENDANTS: FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION IN LEGAL WORKPLACES, 34 PEPPERDINE L.R. 393 (2007).
Our research indicates that family responsibilities discrimination has become a risk management issue for all employers. For a variety of reasons discussed in this article--most notably, the structure and culture of law firms that has been based on traditionally masculine norms and life patterns--legal employers may be particularly susceptible to FRD liability.